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Credit alone or in combination with sunervision has been a ma1or part 
of programs aimed at increasing small-farmer incomes in less-developed areas. 
A few countries with extensive hankin~ svstems, including Brazil, have attempted 
to reach these operators bv sharnlv exnanding the total amount of agricultural 
credit. This has been done on the assumption that some of these funds would 
be provided to those oreviouslv unable to obtain loans. Other countries have 
stressed speciallv packaged credit programs which are conducted at least 
partially outside the normal banking svstem. Supervised credit orograms in 
Latin America, small farmer credit activities in South Viet Nam and Indonesia, 
and cooperative credit efforts in parts of Africa and East Pakistan are 
examoles of this approach. 
To date, the Problems of extending credit to small farmers have been 
largelv viewed from the demand side. F.mnhasis has been nlaced on the conser-
vative nature of small farm operators, their unwillingness to change or assume 
debt risks, their lack of knowledge on how to use credit, their fear of dealing 
with formal credit agencies and the ahsence of profitable investment alter-
natives on their farms. 'lany of the special credit programs have been focused 
on some aspects of these problems, and almost all have included a low interest 
------------
* Colleagues from The Ohio State Universitv and the A~ency for International 
Development nrovided valuable comments on the paper. The discussion 
included herein is the resnonsibilitv of the authors and does not neces-
sarilv reflect the opinion of the sponsoring agencies. 
** Dale W Adams is professor of agricultural economics at The Ohio State 
University. Harlan Davis and Lee Bettis are economists with the Agencv 
for International Develonment in Brazil. 
-2-
rate policv. Little attention. however. h:1c; been given to nroblems on the 
supply side of credit. In the following discussion we suP,gest that ma1or 
credit distribution Problems mav exist. We will also argue that some 
adiustments in current policies might substantiallv increase the flow of 
credit to small farmers through regular banking channels. We use information 
from Brazil to illustrate this argument. 
Background on A..&.rJ_c_t!_~~~al__Credi_t_in Brazil 
Since the earlv J950's Brazil has emPhac;ized various market incentives 
to stimulate agricultural development. '!inimum farm nrices. exchange ntte 
subsidies, trade barriers. tax exemotions and rehates,and inexoensive farm 
credit have been some of the measures ndonted.l/ Especiallv since the mid-
1960's, a substantial increase in the total amount of institutional agricul-
tural credit also has been a prominent agricultural development tool. 
Prior to 1964 four national hrtnl~s and eight state banks provided most 
of the institutional agricultural credit. The Bank of Brazil dominated this 
lending and provided 85 Percent of the total in the earlv 1960's.2/ Bv 1970 
this figure had dropped to less than half because of oolicies which persuaded 
private banks, state hanks and other national banks to increase suhstantiallv 
their agricultural lending. A nart of this increase was related to the Central 
Bank's Resolution 69 of 1967 which required all commercial hanks to allocate 
l/ Further background on Brazil's recent agricultural develonment policies car 
be found in: r.. Edward Schuh, The Agricultural Develonment of Brazil. (New 
York: Praeger, 1970): Gordon W. Smith, ''Brazilian Agricultural Policv, 
1950-67, '' in The Economv of. Br~zil, edited bv H. Ellis, (Berkelev: Univ. 
of California Press, 1969), po. 213-265: and Peter T. Knight, Brazilian 
Agricultural Technol_QAY_and Trade (New York: Prae~er, 1971). 
2/ Additional information on agricultural credit in Brazil can be found in: 
Banco Central do Brazil, Estudio De Credito Agricola No Brazil: Relatorio 
Da Pesquisa Institucional (Rio De Janeiro: Banco Central do Brazil, 1969) 
and Judith Tendler, "Agricultural Credit in Brazil," unpublished report 
dated October 1969, on file Agencv for International Development, Brasilia, 
Brazil. 
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at least 10 percent of their deoosits to agricultural credit.JI Additional 
funds for agricultural credit were provided bv external assistance.~/ 
As can be noted in Table I the real value of institutional agricultural 
credit in Brazil increased bv more than a factor of four from 1960 to 1970. 
This resulted in a sharo increase in the credit-to-agricultural-outout ratio 
from .13 in 1960 to .41 in 1970. Brazil also substantiallv increased the 
amount of agricultural credit availahle in comoarison with non-agricultural 
credit. In 1960 onlv eleven oercent of the total credit portfolio went to 
agriculture, while in 1970 one-quarter went to this sector. 
The ~ural Credit La"' of 1'l(i5 is the hasic enahling legislation defining 
current agricultural credit oolicv.21 Four ohiectives are specified in the 
Law: (1) to stimulate farm investment, (2) to provide additional working 
capital to farmers, (3) to strenp,then the economic oosition of farmers, 
particularly small and medium sized units, and (4) to encourage the aonlication 
of modern technologv to agriculture. In addition to the large overall credit 
buildup, Brazil has mainlv stressed maninulatinn of interest rates and credit 
rationing to achieve thesP ohiectives._ 
~I 
I.ii 
5.1 
At best, the results from this resolution appear to have been mixed: 
for a more detailed discussion see Judith Tendler, "Agricultural Credit 
in Brazil - Part II," unoublished report dated January 1970, on file 
Agencv for International Development, Brasilia, Brazil. 
Dale W. Adams, ''Agricultural Credit in Latin America: A Critical 
Review of External Funding Policv," American Journal of AP,ricultural 
-~QJlQ~, ~1ay 1 Q71. fl. 163. 
~a~ 4,829 of 5 November 1965. Additional ~esolutions (5 of lq65. 
69 of 1967, q1 of 1968 and 181 of 1971) have assisted the implementa-
tion of the basic la~. 
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Interest T{ate Policv 
·- ---- --- - --------
Interest rates on hank credit in Brazil have been closelv regulated 
since at least 1933. Enactment of a usurv law in that vear orohibited 
6/ 
applving rates above 12 percent oer vear.- In 1938, a soecial division 
within the Bank of Brazil, CRF.AT, was organized for the purpose of providing 
official credit at subsidized rates to Brazilian Agriculture. Since 1950 the 
nominal interest charged on agricultural credit has been less than the annual 
rate of inflation, resulting in a negative real charge for the use of agricul-
tural credit. The 12 percent interest ceiling on agricultural loans was 
enforced until 1967. A numher of devices, however, were used to circumvent 
effectively the ceiling. In a few cases additional interest was collected 
sub rosa. In others, banks used tied accounts which reouired the borrower 
to sign for a loan for More than he received. The balance of the loan was 
left on deposit with the bank and the borrower reouired to pav interest on 
the unused monev. 'fore commonl v, service charges were loaded on ton of the 
interest to raise credit costs. 
The 1965 Bank~n_g__~efoi:!!!._Law reaff-irt'led the 12 percent rate but added 
the additional oroviso that interest charges on agricultural credit could 
not exceed 75 percent of the rate for noI'll'laJ conunercial lending. The 
Central Bank Resolution 69 of 1967 authorized a maximum of 6 percent adminis-
tration and inspection fee, in addition to the 12 percent, for agricultural 
loans greater than 50 times the minimum salarv.21 Small borrowers were given 
21 Mario Henrique Simonsen, ''The Problem of Interest T{ates in Brazil,' 
Bolsa Reyiey, (Bank of London and South America, Ltd.), December, 1967, 
op. 648-656. 
2/ Fifty minimum salaries equaled Cr$11,280 in mid-1971. This equaled 
$2,062 at an exchange rate of Cr$5.47, in effect September, 1971. 
Table I 
Institutional Agricultural Credit in Brazil 1960-1970 
-------- - -- - - - -- - - - - - -- -- -- - - - --- - - -- - - - - -- --- -- - ---- - -- - - ------ ---- -- -- -- - -- --- - --
Ratio of Net ~atio 
Agricultural Production Agricultural Internal of 
Year _ ----~oJ!_ns _:fad~ l~u__r_ing__"(e_a_r:___ ___ Credit Product Credit 
Index Index to Total From to 
----- Number!l __ !_9_6_Q_~l_O_O ____ v_alu_e_l!__ _!_9_~Q.~l_Q.Q_ _____ C_!_edi~2!_ ____ Agriculture_~-- -~-t_p_~-
in 'fill ion 'fill ion 
'OOOs 1969 Cr$ 1969 Cr$ 
1960 231 100 1.811 100 0.11 13. 611 
1961 285 123 1.%6 108 0.11 15.240 
1962 441 190 2.625 145 ().14 17.830 
1963 549 237 2.293 126 0.14 15. 723 
1964 771 114 2.924 161 0.19 17.084 
1965 666 288 2.lRO 121 () .14 17.793 
1966 856 371 2. 715 150 0.16 15.773 
1967 1,029 445 3.349 1~5 0.18 16. 7 22 
1968 1,500 649 4.106 227 n.1~ 16.755 
1969 1,145 496 6.489 358 '). 2 3 17.760* 
1970 1,191 515 7.fi60 11?1 0.25 18.826* 
------~----------- ------ ------~--~-
1/ 
21 
3/ 
* 
Various Central Bank of Brazil reports. 
Total credit is equal to the do~estic-credit-cl~ims-on-nrivate sector 
figure published bv International 'tonetarv Fund in International 
Financial Statistics. Data were adiusted to 1969 nrices using the 
General Price Indix nublished hv the r.etulio V:treas Foundation. 
Center of national Accounts, Instituto Rrasileiro de Estatisticn -
Fundacao Getulio Vargas (IBr.E-Fr.v) Co~_n_~ra _ _l:_c;__onomica, Vol. 25, No. 
9 (Rio de Janeiro: FGV, August 1971) no. 107-111. Data were adiusted 
to 1969 prices using the r.eneral Price Indix oublished bv the Fr.V. 
Pro1ected from the 1968 figure bv co1'.1nounding a 6 percent growth rate. 
0.13 
0.13 
0.15 
0.15 
0.17 
0 .12 
() .17 
').20 
n.25 
o. 17 
'l.41 
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an even larger concession.a/ Regarding loans valued at less than 50 minimum 
salaries, the commission and insoection fees were limited to 2 oercent or 
less. Borrowers of small amounts thus, generallv, oaid 13 to 14 percent while 
larger borrowers paid 17 to 18 percent oer annum. With inflation of about 20 
to 25 percent per vear in the late 1960'~ these rates resulted in significant, 
negative real rates of interest. 
Interest rate incentives have also been used to accelerate the diffusion 
of modern inputs. In Aoril 1966 credit was made available for fertilizer our-
chases at zero nominal rates of intere~t to the borrowers through a program 
called FUNFERTIL.2/ Until August 1968 the full amount of the interest charge 
was subsidized. From August 196~ to l'lid-1970 the interest rate subsidv was 
limited to charges up to 14 oercent.~/ In Au~ust 1970 a new orogram, FUNDAG. 
reolaced FUNFERTIL and was aimed at. stimulating the use of a number of modern 
inputs: fertilizer, lime, liveqtock mineralq and protein suonlements, imoroved 
seed, artificial insemination. and agricultural chemicals. Under this program 
farmers paid onlv 7 oercent annual interest on credit-used to ourchase these 
inputs. 
A recent announcement bv the Bank of Brazil indicated that a oolicv oro-
viding for interest-free loans for some inouts and for highlv subsidized rates 
for other oroduction costs (farm eouioment, etc.) would be aoolied in the 
l}_/ 
21 
The interest rates and commiqsions ouoted here are on loans covering 
operating expenses reoavable within one vear. SliPhtlv different 
charges arc allowed on loanq for longer terms. 
This program was called the Fundo de Estimulo Financeiro ao Uso de 
Fertilizantes e Suolementos 'Unerais (FUNFERTIL). 
!Q/ Further information on results fro~ FUNFERTIL can be found in Joio 
Braga Costa, ''Agricultural Inputs: Fertilizer," unpublished reoort 
prepared for USAID/Brazil, dated August 5, 1969, on file The ARencv for 
International Develooment. Brasilia. Brazil. 
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economicallv depressed Northeast. 111 
Results from Credit and Interest Rate Policies 
Brazil's agricultural credit orogram during the 1960's has been asso-
ciated with some notable successes. Cultivated land, for example, increased 
from 26 million hectares in 1960 to 35 million in 1970, and chemical ferti-
lizer use ;umped from 300 thousand to 820 thousand metric tons. 121 Overall 
agricultural yield indexes rose from 112 in 1960 to 136 in 1970. Over 100 
thousand tractors for agricultural use were ourchased bv farmers from 1960 to 
1970. Wheat output has quadrupled during the past decade. Less spectacular, 
but nonetheless imoressive increases in outnut of sovbeans, corn, rice, orange~ 
and poultry have also taken place in the past 10 vears. 
The huge increase in institutional a~ricultural credit at concessional 
interest rates, in coniunction with other price policies, have clearlv plaved 
an important role in facilitatin~ these increases in nroductive capacitv as 
well as output. It apoears, therefore, that at least three of the four ob;ec-
tives specified in the 1965 Rural C~edit Law have been at least partially 
achieved: farm investment has been stimulated, additional working caoital 
has been provided to farmers, and use of modern technolo~v in agriculture has 
been encouraged. These are substantial accomplishments. 
There are reasons to believe, however, that little pro~ess has been 
made toward the ob;ective of improving the economic position of small and 
11/ 
!11 
.Journal do Col'lllle_rcio, Recife, Pernambuco, lfovember Ii, 1971. 
These figures are taken from: William Charles Nelson, ''An Economic 
Analysis of Fertilizer Utilization in Brazil" unpublished Ph.D. 
Dissertation, Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Socio-
logy, The Ohio State University, 1971 and John Stitzlein, ''The 
Economics of Agricultural "'techanization in Southern Brazil" 
unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, Department of Agricultural Economics 
and Rural Sociologv, The Ohio State Universitv, 1972. 
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medium sized farm units through credit. Results from a general sample of 
392 farm operators selected and interviewed in the states of 'Rio r.rande do 
Sul and Santa Catarina in 1Q65 and reinterviewed in 1969 show this rather 
clearly. As can be noted in Table I, during this period the real value of 
aggregate institutional agricultural credit in Brazil more or less tripled. 
The availabilitv of agricultural credit in the two states studied increased 
at a slower pace, but more than doubled during 1965 to 1969.11/ Institu-
tional credit use among the 392 farms studied increased at a slower rate than 
was indicated bv the state and national figures. Overall the farmers studied 
increased their institutional credit use, in real terms, bv 73 percent.lll/ 
The increase in credit use. however, was narrowlv concentrated. Onlv 
twentv-three of the farmers received loans of 5 thousand new cruzeiros in 
1965. Nevertheless, they absorbed almost three-quarter~ of the total 
increase in the institutional credit available for all 392 farmers by 1969. 
It is also interesting to note that the number of institutional loans granted 
all 392 farmers essentiallv did not change between 1965 and 1969. Value-wise 
15/ there was heavy concentration and loan-wise there was little diffusion.~ 
An earlier study of the distributional effects of a special Brazilian 
J.3/ Instituto Brasileiro de Estatistica (IBr.E), Anuario Estatistico do 
Brazil, volumes for 1966 & 1970, ('Rio de Janeiro: IBGE, 1967 & 
1971) p. 268 and op. 448-449, respectivelv. 
!!!/ Dale W. Adams and others, "Credit-Brazil" unpublished 'Research Note, 
Number 8, on Agricultural Capital Formation and Technological Change, 
Department of Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociologv, The nhio 
State University, Januarv 28, 1Q71. 
l.21 Further information on changes in credit use among the small-to-
medium sized operators can he found in Joseph L. Tomm.v, "Credit 
Use and Capital Formation on Small-to-~edium Size Farms in Southern 
Brazil, 1965 to 1969" unpublished "1.S. Thesis, Department of A~i­
cultural Economics and Rural Sociologv, The Ohio State Universitv, 
1971. 
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credit-fertilizer program begun in 1965 suggests similar results. A 
very limited number of farmers absorbed most of the additional credit 
provided for fertilizer purchases. ~anv of these borrowers had been 
substantial institutional borrowers oreviouslv. 161 
An analysis of the agricultural loan oortfolio of the Northeast 
Development Bank (BNB) servicing Northeast Brazil suggests that not only 
have additional credit funds not spread. but there even mav have been 
some contraction. In the late 1960's the BNB provided approximatelv one-
quarter of the institutional agricultural credit in the Northeast. From 
1960 to 1967 BNB steadilv increased the number of loans to agriculture 
as well as total value loaned. Almost 29 thousand individual agricul-
tural loans were made in 1967 bv the BNB. 17 / This number decreased verv 
sharplv, however, over the next'three vears. and in 1970 less than 11 
thousand loans were made. This was fewer agricultural loans than the 
Bank made in 1961 when its agricultural loan portfolio value was onlv 
about 45 percent of its 1970 value in real terms. From 1968 to 1970 the 
BNB eliminated from its oortfolio gver 12 thousand of its 19 thousand 
clients who borrowed less than SO minimum salaries. 181 At the same time 
it increased the number of agricultural loans in the 1,500 minimum 
salaries class bv more than three times. These studies and data stronglv 
suggest that Brazil's recent credit oolicv has had little positive imnact 
16/ 
ill 
18/ 
Donald l.f. Sorensen and others, ''An Evaluation of the CNCR Fertilizer 
Loan Program in Brazil," AFC Research Report 118, Oeoartment of 
Agricultural Economics and Rural Sociologv, The Ohio State Universitv, 
December, 1967. 
Data and information which immediatelv follows are from unpublished 
worksheets from the Division of Rural Credit. Bank of Northeast Brazil. 
Some of the decrease in numbers was due to drought conditions and 
some shifting of small borrowers to cooperative sources of credit. 
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on credit problems of small-to-medium sized farms. The lack of results 
in this regard are esoecially nernlexing in light of the size of the 
overall credit increase. Individual banks can hardlv be blamed, however. 
as thev are following a perfectlv rational course to minimize costs. The 
problem lies with the oolicv which makes lending to small operators expen-
sive. 
A number of policvmakers in Brazil still feel that the lack of effec-
tive demand among ooerators of small-to-medium sized farms for oroduction 
credit is the main reason for the concentration of loans. Some conclude 
that "spoon feeding' through supervised credit programs is the only wav to 
increase significantlv credit demand among this groun. 191 But Erven and 
Rask report that small farmers in one area of southern Brazil rapidlv in-
creased their borrowing from banks once credit became available.Zill Rao 
reported that small farms had much higher economic returns at the margins 
to innuts which credit tvpically ourchases than did large farm onerators 
who obtained most of the credit."1/ He also found no oositive relationship 
between credit use and familv consumr>tion even among the smallest farms 
studied. 
19/ 
ll/ 
For a descriotion of on~ such proP,ram in Brazil see: Jose Paulo 
Ribeiro and Clifton ~. Wh:trton Jr. ''The ACAR Program in '1inas r.erais, 
Brazil." in Subsistenc_£__A~_iculture and Fconomic Develo_P-men~, edited 
bv Clifton R. Wharton Jr. (Chicago: Aldine, 1%9) op. 242-418. 
Bernard Erven and Norman Rask., "Credit Infuqion as a Small Farmer 
Development Strategv--The lbiruba Pilot Proiect in Southern Brazil", 
Economic!'! and Sociologv Occa!'lional Paoer No. 48, Department of Agri-
cultural Economics and Rural Sociologv, OSU, December, lq71. 
Bodepudi Prasada Rao, "'The Economics of Agricultural Credit-Use in 
Southern Brazil'', unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Department of 
Agricultural Economics ~nd Rural Sociologv, The Ohio State Universitv, 
1970 
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We tentatively conclude from tlu~1?e studies that a significant 
reservoir of unsatisfied credit demand may exist in the rural area of 
Brazil, which the current credit policy is not addressing. This conclu-
sion presumes favorable factor price ratios and technologies, the avail-
ability of complementarv inputs and suitable institutional arrangements for 
profitably utilizing credit even at the current highly subsidized interest 
rates. Some or all of these conditions may exist in various regions of 
Brazil, but the evidence is scattered and/or unavailable in most cases for 
any meaningful assessment. With the recent increase in amount of credit 
available in the system it no longer seems olausible to rationalize this 
on the basis of overall credit shortage. It is also difficult to continue 
to explain the skewed credit distribution by the ''pistolao'' dogma, that is. 
certain people receive credit because they have oolitical influence with 
the bankers. Influence olays some part in any human interaction, but it 
probably explains only a small part of Brazil's credit distribution problem. 
Credit pricing policy, plus some additional administrative procedures appear 
to be the most important factors in-determining the severe credit rationing 
procedures used by Brazilian banks toward small agricultural borrowers. 
Economic logic suggests that credit which is negatively oriced in real 
terms, has few storage costs or risks, is durable, and is easily exchanged 
for other items will have a near horizontal demand schedule. Interest rates 
have a very restricted role to play in allocating credit under these circum-
stances. In fact, interest charges may be irrelevent to some borrowers, 
particularly smaller ones, as they cannot get credit at any price. A shift 
to the right of the supplv schedule will be absorbed mainly by those who are 
first into the credit market. At negative interest rates farmers can afford 
to use loans for pro1ects whose rates of return are near zero. As long as 
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the ratio of return is greater than the real cost of borrowing it will 
pay to invest. Under these excess demand conditions, and to the extent 
they are legally allowed, banks will concentrate their funds in large 
loans to minimize average administration costs. Thev will further trv to 
minimize operational risks by lending mainlv to those operators with high 
equity-to-credit ratios. If banks are forced to charge less interest on 
small than larger loans, this will provide further incentive to increase 
loan size. 
An interesting associated point is that low interest rates on credit 
for small farmers have often been iustified in the nast because policvmakers 
felt these farmers had high elasticities of credit demand with respect to 
interest rates. Little empirical evidence has been generated to substan-
tiate this point, and we feel the oronosition is hi~hly suspect. On the 
basis of the Brazilian exnerience, however, it appears that banks have 
very interest-sensitive supplv schedules. The low interest rate policy may 
not be needed to induce small farmers to use credit where it can he profit-
ably anplied. But, the inexpensive.credit policy mav seriously thwart the 
incentives of the lender to make loans to these farmers who were the intended 
beneficiaries of this policy! 
Conclusions and Poli_cv Reco.!1lltlendations 
The Brazil experience reaffirms the important role of credit in agri-
cultural development. It teaches the lesson, however, that ma1or nolicv 
adjustments are needed in order to channel more credit to small farmers. 
It also hints that nrohlems of credit distribution rather than demand are 
important in explaining the current skewed allocation of credit. Overall 
supply of credit does not seem to be the ma1or problem in Brazil. Rather, 
the lack of aporopriate policies which provide banks with economic incen-
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tives to lend to small farmers aooears to be the main constraint. 
Incentives for the banks could-lie provided throu~h any one of a 
number of policy alternatives. As a minimum, credit charges on all sizes 
of agricultural loans should be equalized in Brazil: banks should not be 
penalized for making small loans. It appears politically impossible to 
charge higher rates of interest on small loans than large loans. But 
higher real interest charges across-the-board for agricultural credit 
might achieve many of the same purposes. Increased credit charges to 
large borrowers may force them to reduce their borrowin~ substantially 
and expand the funds available for small loans. Banks could also be 
encouraged to make small loans by a differential discount rate policy by 
the Central Bank: that is, a larger discount spread might be allowed on 
small loans than on large loans. 
Efforts to lower the administrative costs of small loans may also 
provide added incentive. ~any banks in Brazil require almost the same 
amount of paper work on a one hundred dollar loan as on a ten thousand 
dollar loan. Few bank managers, nevertheless, express serious concern 
about the willingness of small borrowers to repav loans. Some in fact 
feel that small borrowers are more likelv to repay than large borrowers. 
New administrative procedures which required less documentation on small 
loans along with modern data processing might bear fruit. Loans up to a 
certain limit might be made almost automaticallv to borrowers with good 
credit rating with the bank, to aoolicants for loans reconunended bv exten-
sion agents, and to people who have several letters of recommendation from 
borrowers in good standing with the bank. Loosening of lending procedures 
would likely result in some increase in default rates, but this loss could 
be more than covered by lower administrative costs. If it were found that 
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default risks were a serious block to banks lending to small farms a 
national default insurance program ~ight eliminate much of this risk. 
Improving the incentive system for banks to loan to smaller borrowers 
will not resolve all small farmer credit problems. It should, however, 
clear away a ~ood bit of the fog which currentlv surrounds this topic. 
When banks begin to channel vigorouslv credit to small farmers at 
realistic prices, it should be possible to identifv more clearly demand 
constraints caused by lack of profitable investment alternatives, shorta~e 
of appropriate technology, adverse tenure svstems, effects of unstable 
marketin~ conditions, and need for supervision or soecial lendin~ arran~e­
ments. The importance of these issues cannot be clearlv determined until 
the distribution of credit is rationalized and current credit oolicies 
substantially ad1usted. Inexpensive credit does not appear to be a bargain 
for small farmers. 
